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The appeal of pay-for-performance in health care derives 
from the conceptual view that paying doctors and hospi-
tals more to deliver better care will encourage them to 
deliver better care. What lessons can be learned from the 
successes  and  failures  of  pay-for-performance  in  health 
care settings that apply to pay-for-performance in popula-
tion health? We argue that pay-for-performance requires 
conditions that are not easily met in population health 
settings.  Pay-for-performance  has  focused  on  narrow 
clinical problems whose success depends on identifiable 
actors with the motivation and resources to change clinical 
processes or outcomes. In contrast, population health has 
broad goals, many antecedents, and no single, identifiable 
fiduciary (a person who holds assets in trust for a benefi-
ciary). Nevertheless, with careful attention, conditions for 
successful pay-for-performance in population health might 
be met. 
Introduction
One  reason  pay-for-performance  has  been  adopted  in 
health  care  is  that  people  like  the  idea  that  doctors  or 
hospitals should be rewarded for high-quality care. They 
particularly hate the reverse: that doctors and hospitals 
get paid regardless of the quality of care they provide.
Indeed, the appeal of pay-for-performance in health care 
is sustained even in the face of at least 2 other conceptual 
issues that might argue against it. First, societal views of 
financial incentives are mixed. Paying people more to do 
what they were supposed to do in the first place conflicts 
with  notions  of  professionalism.  Should  we  pay  doctors 
more to treat patients well when treating them well should 
be the minimal standard? Might putting a price on a pro-
fessional  goal  to  promote  its  success  cheapen  its  value, 
rather  than  enhance  it  (1)?  Could  financial  incentives 
applied in some settings crowd out professional behavior 
in others, causing elements of care that lack incentives to 
become neglected?
Second,  explicit  incentives  may  undermine  intrinsic 
motivation and professionalism and thus are rarely used 
in other professions. Although there are exceptions (eg, 
sales representatives, financial managers, and some teach-
ers and athletes), rather than being praised for the clever 
ways these financial arrangements align stakeholder inter-
ests, explicit incentive systems are often scorned for their 
failures or their unintended consequences. In general, we 
are comfortable with market-based incentives that reward 
those who build better mousetraps, but professions rarely 
use explicit systems. Against this backdrop, the firm hold 
taken by health care pay-for-performance systems, based 
on concept alone, is surprising.
The allure of pay-for-performance systems in health care 
derives  from  the  intuition  that  financial  incentives  will 
help to achieve health care-related goals. Implementing 
that  intuition  requires  4  conditions  (Box):  First,  there 
must be some stakeholder willing to pay for performance. 
Second,  there  must  be  some  agent  with  the  ability  to 
achieve that performance who can, if successful, be paid. 
Third, there must be some measures of that performance 
on which to judge success and base payment. Fourth, in 
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the end there must be some evidence that the approach 
achieves its overall goals or at least that the system on the 
whole produces more good than harm. What does the expe-
rience with these 4 conditions in health care settings tell 
us about how pay-for-performance might work in popula-
tion heath settings?
1.  Someone willing and able to pay for performance.
2.  Someone able to achieve that performance who can be paid.
3.  Measures of that performance on which to judge success and base 
payment.
4.  Evidence that the system as a whole produces more good than harm.
 
Box. Four conditions for pay-for-performance in health care.
Who Pays Whom?
In health care, various stakeholders have revealed their 
willingness to pay for performance. These include payers 
such as insurance companies or government agencies like 
the  Centers  for  Medicare  and  Medicaid  Services,  indi-
vidual  provider  organizations  that  create  incentives  for 
clinicians within their systems, or organizations like the 
Veterans Health Administration with combined payer and 
provider roles.
Similarly,  doctors  and  hospitals  have  revealed  their 
willingness to be paid for performance. Since doctors and 
hospitals are used to being paid for the care of patients, it 
is a relatively small step to adjust those payments — for 
example, with a bonus or a withhold for providing better 
or worse care to their patients against some measures. 
More importantly, doctors and hospitals are already in 
the  business  of  delivering  health  care,  they  typically 
have the tools to do so, and they generally see deliver-
ing health care as their responsibility and within their 
authority and ability.
Finding analogous stakeholders in population health is 
less clear. Even if we presume that national or regional 
governments have a stake in population health and can 
be the payer, who are the agents of population health who 
can be paid? Could hospitals and doctors be the agents of 
population health and accountable for its gains? Could we 
assign people, rather than patients, to doctors and hospi-
tals and judge the doctors and hospitals by the health of 
their assignees whether they receive health care or not? 
To make that work, hospitals and doctors would have to 
shift their focus from health care, the process they are   
comfortable with, to health, the outcome at least implic-
itly they hope to achieve. Most hospitals and doctors take 
responsibility only for those people who walk in their doors 
and consider only a limited set of health care-related health 
conditions. Typically, they do not consider a population of 
people who are not patients, elements of those people’s 
health that are not connected to health care they provide, 
and exposures or outcomes that may play out over the life 
course. Accountable care organizations (ACOs) are clinical 
provider groups responsible for the outcomes of a defined 
population and the costs of achieving those outcomes (2). 
By emphasizing populations, not patients, and health out-
comes (including population health care cost) rather than 
health care processes, ACOs might redirect the focus from 
patients to people and move closer to population health 
goals. These activities could be advanced by investments 
in health information infrastructure and by objective and 
comparative measures of community health.
Indeed, even if we could shift the focus of doctors and 
hospitals from patients to people, we would face the addi-
tional  challenge  that  health  care  plays  a  small  role  in 
population health. Instead, population health is the prod-
uct of a wide range of social, biological, and environmental 
forces, including education, income, social status, genetic 
endowment,  physical  exposure,  personal  behavior,  and 
social  context.  The  comprehensiveness  that  makes  this 
model so appealing also makes it hard to find people whose 
job it is to make it better. 
If hospitals and doctors are not the agents of popula-
tion health, we might assume there is some other entity 
to be paid — a body accountable for achieving population 
health goals. Because the inputs to population health are 
multiple and tangled, this body might take the form of 
a  collaborative  spanning  groups  concerned  with  educa-
tion, health care, transportation, housing, environment, 
and other areas that reflect the complex causal pathways 
leading to health. Questions would remain even if such 
bodies  were  created.  Are  performance  payments  to  the 
body itself, in the form of more resources to accomplish 
goals? Or are they payments to individuals of the body 
—  payments  that  would  go  into  the  pockets  of  people 
rather  than  into  the  budgets  of  programs?  Are  there 
second-tier payments for performance? For example, do 
these bodies distribute performance bonuses to those who 
help them achieve their goals — good school teachers, for 
example? And, if so, might these bodies begin to look more 
like an intermediate form of government itself: broadly   VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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constituted,  acting  through  others,  with  institutional 
rather than individual budgets?
How Do We Measure Performance?
The substantive challenge in paying for performance in 
health care settings has been developing and implement-
ing  measures.  Cynical  observers  might  have  predicted 
that  physicians  and  hospitals  would  be  most  engaged 
about the money at stake. But instead, most of the dia-
logue has focused on whether the clinical measures make 
sense for patient goals and whether they treat physicians 
and hospitals fairly.
Structure, process, and outcome
In  health  care,  performance  measures  can  be  divided 
into  those  that  reflect  the  structure  of  care  (eg,  use  of 
intensivists in intensive care units), processes of care (eg, 
screening for colon cancer), or the outcomes of care (eg, 
the  risk-adjusted  mortality  for  coronary  artery  bypass 
graft [CABG] surgery). Sometimes the process measures 
reflect  items  almost  entirely  in  the  operator’s  control 
(whether colon cancer screening was ordered) but some-
times these measures reflect elements not entirely in the 
operator’s control and require substantial patient partici-
pation (whether the patient received colon cancer screen-
ing).  Sometimes  the  outcome  measures  reflect  clinical 
events that anyone would consider important (mortality), 
but often the outcome measures are intermediate clinical 
outcomes such as control of blood pressure, cholesterol, or 
blood glucose that are linked with outcomes patients care 
about but which are symptomless themselves.
To advance population health, we must decide whether 
to  measure  the  distal  outcomes  we  care  about,  such 
as  life  expectancy  and  its  distribution  across  popula-
tion segments. These outcomes are a large part of what 
most people mean when they discuss population health. 
Focusing on them would appear to align measures with 
goals,  but  their  distant  horizon  limits  their  usefulness 
— particularly if we want to find, reward, and encourage 
the people responsible for achieving them. In health care, 
when we worry about cardiovascular disease, we often do 
not wait to measure outcomes like heart attacks. Those 
outcomes are too rare at the level of the individual pro-
vider, too multifactorial to clearly tether cause and effect, 
and too far in the future to provide the kind of immediate 
reward that motivates good behavior. Instead, we substi-
tute intermediate markers reflecting control of glucose, 
blood pressure, lipids, and tobacco use. Those markers are 
appealing because their place on the causal pathway gives 
them the added credibility of mediators (3), because we 
can measure them easily and precisely, because we have 
tools at our disposal to influence them, and because we 
can identify the people responsible for doing so. However, 
analogs in population health are hard to find. Our under-
standing of the causal pathways toward population health 
is limited. We must determine the intermediate markers 
and mediators for sweeping population health goals and 
whether  to  measure  structural  determinants  of  health 
(eg, good schools) or the processes toward that goal (eg, 
wealth or income redistribution plans embedded in tax 
policies, incentives to foster civic groups and their result-
ing social capital).
Measurement
In the abstract, measures must be reliable, valid, and 
inexpensive to collect, and they must quantify events of 
sufficient frequency to sustain stable estimates over time. 
Only a small slice of the activities in health care settings 
meet these criteria. Hofer and colleagues (4) found that 
even for a condition as prevalent as diabetes — for which 
glucose  levels  are  frequently  measured  —  individual 
physicians would need more than 100 patients to provide 
measures  of  those  intermediate  markers  statistically 
reliable  enough  to  distinguish  their  performance  from 
that of their peers. Yet more than 90% of physicians in 
busy primary care settings care for no more than 60 such 
patients (4).
Population health measures may be substantially less 
constrained by these limitations. Large populations (eg, 
geographic  or  political  regions,  racial/ethnic  subgroups) 
can  probably  support  sufficient  observations  for  stable 
estimates. However, population health measures may face 
a different challenge because many important questions 
in population health reflect the distribution of health out-
comes across diverse population subsegments. Reporting 
the mean life expectancy of the United States, for example, 
misrepresents a population health story that is as much 
about heterogeneity as it is about a central tendency. An 
examination of racial differences in the management of 
localized prostate cancer in Pennsylvania simultaneously 
revealed that whites were more likely to get surgery than 
blacks, that whites and blacks were equally likely to get VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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surgery, and that blacks were more likely to get surgery 
than  whites  (5).  All  of  these  results  were  correct  but 
reflected answers to subtly different questions that relied 
on different parsing of the same aggregate data.
Fairness and resistance to gaming
A substantial concern in pay-for-performance in health 
care settings has been that conventional approaches are 
susceptible to gaming as clinicians or hospitals manipu-
late their circumstances to get ahead. One common perfor-
mance metric in primary care settings is the percentage of 
patients with diabetes who have a glycosylated hemoglo-
bin level (a measure of intermediate-term glucose control) 
below a particular threshold, usually 7%. On its face, the 
measure seems credible and useful, but physicians seeking 
to improve performance on this measure could overdiag-
nose the disorder, overtreat it, avoid or disenroll patients 
who belong to a high-risk group or have difficulty control-
ling their blood glucose levels, or relocate the practice to an 
area with better resources to help patients with controlling 
their diabetes (6).
These manipulations may sound exaggerated, but some 
events surrounding New York State’s program of public 
reporting of CABG surgical mortality suggest they occur. 
Evidence of such manipulations is mixed (7). To some, 
the program looked like a huge success because CABG 
mortality in New York State dropped (8). However, public 
reporting for CABG mortality in New York was followed by 
a lower severity of illness among those patients operated 
on (suggesting that surgeons were avoiding sick patients) 
(9); an increase in the severity of illness of patients from 
New York operated on in hospitals in contiguous states 
near  the  New  York  State  border  (suggesting  transfer 
out of state, where mortality was not publicly reported) 
(10); and a widening of racial disparities in CABG sur-
gery (suggesting that surgeons used race as a proxy for 
an  increased  risk  of  a  poor  outcome  and  preferentially 
avoided minority patients) (11).
Paying  for  performance  in  population  health  might 
be considerably less susceptible to this kind of gaming. 
Jurisdictions (or whatever might define the denomina-
tor  or  population)  are  not  so  easily  manipulated,  and 
population  health  goals  are  not  typically  linked  with 
diagnoses  or  conditions  whose  definition  can  be  easily 
shifted.  Still,  results  that  can  be  achieved  in  affluent 
and poor areas differ considerably. Achieving fairness in   
paying for population health performance may be even 
more challenging because the underlying causes of differ-
ences in health are broad and fundamental (12) and hard 
to overcome one by one.
A resulting concern is that pay-for-performance will like-
ly reward programs or areas that have better resources, 
penalize those that do not, and thereby widen disparities 
in  care.  For  that  reason,  pay-for-improvement  initia-
tives have been proposed in health care so that clinicians 
are not judged against fixed and uniform standards but 
against their ability to improve measures from their own 
baselines. These approaches might be proposed for popula-
tion settings as well. 
Priority
One of the concerns clinicians raise about performance 
measurement  is  that  it  seems  to  focus  on  the  wrong 
things.  Only  a  small  fraction  of  patient  conditions  or 
complaints are measured. Most never can be, because the 
evidence for the right approach is insufficient or because 
the  circumstances  happen  too  infrequently  to  provide 
stable measurement. And even though some performance 
measures  are  firmly  evidence-based  (eg,  considerable 
evidence suggests that screening for colon cancer saves 
lives), such performance measures may still focus on the 
wrong things. Stakeholders worry as much about what is 
not measured as what is measured because elements of 
care that are not measured may lose priority, and what 
is measurable has no necessary connection with what is 
important  (13).  These  concepts  underlie  concerns  that 
performance measurement can lead to “teaching to the 
test,” as attention is diverted away from the items that 
trouble patients and toward the items for which measure-
ment systems exist.
Setting priorities in population health might be easier 
than  setting  those  in  individual  health  care  settings 
because population health goals reflect big thinking and 
large targets. Patients have individual goals: “I want my 
knees to stop hurting”; “I do not want to die from breast 
cancer.” Population goals are more general: “Extend life,” 
“reduce disability,” “promote health.” Everyone can accept 
the priority those broad goals have and feel their personal 
relevance. In contrast to health care priorities, population 
health  priorities  are  more  typically  expressed  as  basic 
goals that are more uniformly accepted.VOLUME 7: NO. 5
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Does It Work?
There  is  scant  literature  about  the  effectiveness  of 
performance measurement in improving health care (14) 
and  even  less  about  the  effectiveness  of  the  more  spe-
cific  approach  of  using  financial  incentives  paired  with   
performance measurement (15,16). General evidence sug-
gests  that  measuring  performance  on  specific  indica-
tors (eg, success with glycosylated hemoglobin measures) 
improves performance of those indicators (17,18). But those   
measures of success might be too narrow. Success on the 
measured  indicators  does  not  reveal  what  happens  to 
unmeasured indicators. In 2 studies, unmeasured activi-
ties did not decline in the setting of performance measure-
ment (19) and other quality improvement activities (20), 
but the concern remains.
Furthermore, improvements in glycosylated hemoglobin 
may not improve overall health or life expectancy. In a 
cohort study, Higashi and colleagues (21) observed a posi-
tive association between life expectancy and the number 
of clinical performance targets patients had met in their 
health care. In another study, hospitals with better per-
formance in process measures for the care of patients with 
acute  myocardial  infarction  also  had  slightly  improved 
risk-adjusted mortality for this condition (22). However, 
many studies have found no relationship between process 
measures and outcomes (23,24).
Conclusions
We have learned a great deal about paying for perfor-
mance in health care through developing and implement-
ing pay-for-performance programs. Because little evidence 
exists that pay-for-performance (in its current form) reliably 
improves health care, our greatest lessons may be about the 
potential  problems  with  pay-for-performance:  what  does 
not work and what can go wrong. Despite past failures and 
unanticipated consequences, substantial optimism remains 
that paying for performance can be part of the solution to 
improve health care quality. Indeed, the problems that have 
been uncovered have been seen less as reasons to give up 
and more as lessons to lead improvement.
Attempts to improve population health through paying 
for performance will probably follow similar patterns. The 
specific actors and measures will need to be considerably 
different, but it seems likely that any process that moves 
forward will face similar challenges in the form of both 
failures and unintended consequences. The sense of prior-
ity about the goals of population health and the sense of 
optimism about the process of paying for performance will 
probably determine whether any early failures are seen 
as discouraging or as opportunities to make the system 
better.
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